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Abstract
This paper studies the efficiency gains from distorting savings in dynamic Mirrleesian
private-information economies. We develop a method that pertubs the consumption
process optimally while preserving incentive compatibility. The Inverse Euler equa-
tion holds at the new optimized allocation. Starting from an equilibrium where agents
can save freely allows us to compute the efficiency gains from savings disortions. We
investigate how these gains depend on a limited set of features of the economy. We
find an important role for general equilibrium effects. In particular, efficiency gains
are greatly reduced when, rather than assuming a fixed interest rate, decreasing re-
turns to capital are incorporated with a neoclassical technology. We compute the ef-
ficiency gains for the incomplete market model in Aiyagari [1994] and find them to
be relatively modest for the baseline calibration. For higher levels of uncertainty, the
efficiency gains can be sizable, but we find that most of the improvements can then
attributed to the relaxation of borrowing constraints, rather than the introduction of
savings distortions.
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1 Introduction
Recent work has upset a cornerstone result in optimal tax theory. According to Ramsey
models, capital income should eventually go untaxed [Chamley, 1986, Judd, 1985]. In
other words, individuals should be allowed to save freely and without distortions at the
social rate of return to capital. This important benchmark has dominated formal thinking
on this issue. By contrast, in economies with idiosyncratic uncertainty and private infor-
mation it is generally suboptimal to allow individuals to save freely: constrained efficient
allocations satisfy an Inverse Euler equation, instead of the agent's standard intertempo-
ral Euler equation [Diamond and Mirrlees, 1977, Rogerson, 1985, Ligon, 1998]. Recently,
extensions of this result have been interpreted as counterarguments to the Chamley-
Judd no-distortion benchmark [Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski, 2003, Albanesi and
Sleet, 2006, Kocherlakota, 2005, Werning, 2002].
This paper explores the quantitative importance of these arguments. To do so, we start
from an equilibrium where individuals save freely, without distortions, and examine the
efficiency gains obtained from introducing optimal savings distortions. The issue we ad-
dress is largely unexplored because—deriving first-order conditions aside—it is difficult
to solve dynamic economies with private information, except for some very particular
cases, such as shocks that are i.i.d. over time. 1 We develop a new approach that sidesteps
these difficulties.
We lay down an infinite-horizon Mirleesian economy with neoclassical technology.
Agents consume and work in every period. Preferences between consumption and work
are assumed additively separable. Agents experience skill shocks that are private infor-
mation, so that feasible allocations must be incentive-compatible.
Constrained efficient allocations satisfy a simple intertemporal condition for consump-
tion known as the Inverse Euler equation. This condition is incompatible with the agents'
standard Euler equation, implying that constrained efficient allocations cannot be decen-
tralized in competitive equilibria where agents save freely at the technological rate of
return to capital. Some form of savings distortion is needed.
Equivalently, starting from an incentive compatible allocation obtained from an equi-
librium where agents save freely, efficiency gains are possible with the introduction of
saving distortions. In this paper we are interested in computing these gains. We do so by
perturbing the consumption assignment and holding the labor assignment unchanged,
while preserving incentive compatibility. The new allocation satisfies the Inverse Euler
equation and delivers the same utility while freeing up resources. The reduction in re-
1 Other special cases that have been extensively explored are unemployment and disability insurance.
sources is our measure of efficiency gains. By leaving the labor assignment unchanged,
we focus on the efficiency gains of introducing savings distortions, without changing the
incentive structure, implicit in the labor assignment. In this way, we sidestep resolving
the optimal trade-off between insurance and incentives.
There are several advantages to our approach. To begin with, our exercise does not
require specifying some components of the economy. In particular, no knowledge of in-
dividual labor assignment or the disutility of work function is required. In this way, the
degree to which work effort responds to incentives is not needed. This robustness is im-
portant, since empirical knowledge of these elasticities remains incomplete. Indeed, our
efficiency gains depend only on the original consumption assignment, the utility function
for consumption and technology. The planning problem we set up minimizes resources
over a class of perturbations for consumption. This problem has the advantage of be-
ing tractable, even for rich specifications of uncertainty. In our view, having this flex-
ibility is important for quantitative work. Furthermore, efficiency gains are shaped by
intuitive properties involving both partial equilibrium and general equilibrium consider-
ations, such as the variance of consumption growth and its dispersion across agents and
time, the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the concavity of the production function.
Finally, our measure of efficiency gains can provide lower and upper bounds on the full
efficiency gains obtained from joint reforms that introduce savings distortions and change
the assignment of labor.
Two approaches are possible to quantify the magnitude of these efficiency gains, and
we pursue both. The first approach uses directly as a baseline allocation an empirically
plausible process of individual consumption. The second approach recognizes that the
empirical knowledge of consumption risk is more limited than that of income risk. It uses
as a baseline allocation the outcome of a competitive economy where agents are subject
to idiosyncratic skill shocks and can save freely by accumulating a risk-free bond.
Following the first approach, we analyze a model where the baseline allocation fea-
tures geometric random walk processes for individual consumption and utility is loga-
rithmic. In this case, we obtain closed form solutions. The perturbed allocation is simple.
It is obtained by multiplying the baseline consumption assignment by a deterministic de-
clining sequence. The size of this downward drift and the efficiency gains are increasing
in the variance of consumption growth, which indexes the strength of the precautionary
savings motive. Using a fixed interest rate, the efficiency gains span a wide range, going
from 0% to 10%, depending primarily on the variance of consumption growth, for which
empirical evidence is limited.
We find that, general equilibrium effects can dramatically mitigate these numbers.
This is because tilting individual consumption profiles requires decumulating capital.
With a neoclassical technology, as capital is decumulated, the return to capital increases,
raising the cost of further decumulation. With a capital share of 1/3, we show that effi-
ciency gains range from 0% to 0.25%, for plausible values of the variance in consumption
growth.
Turning to the second approach, we adopt the incomplete-market specification from
the seminal work of Aiyagari [1994]. In this economy, there is no aggregate uncertainty.
Individuals face idiosyncratic labor income risk that they cannot insure. They can save
in a risk-free asset, but cannot borrow. At a steady state equilibrium the interest rate is
constant and equal to the marginal product of capital. Although individual consumption
fluctuates, the cross-sectional distribution of assets and consumption is invariant. We take
Our baseline allocation from this steady state equilibrium.
Even with logarithmic utility, taking baseline consumption from this equilibrium model
implies two differences relative to the geometric random-walk case, discussed previously.
On the one hand, as is well known, agents are able to smooth consumption quite ef-
fectively in these Bewley models. This tends to minimize the variance of consumption
growth and pushes towards low efficiency gains. On the other hand, consumption is not
a geometric random walk. In particular, expected consumption growth is not equalized
over time or across agents. Indeed, a steady state requires a stable cross-sectional distri-
bution for consumption, implying some mean-reverting forces. This pushes for greater
efficiency gains, because there are gains from aligning expected consumption growth in
individual consumption across agents, without changing the growth in aggregate con-
sumption or capital."
We replicate the calibrations in Aiyagari [1994] and compute the steady state equi-
librium for a number of income processes and values for the coefficient of relative risk
aversion. For Aiyagari's baseline calibration, we find that efficiency gains are relatively
small, below 0.2% for all utility specifications. Away from this baseline calibration, we
find that efficiency gains increase with the coefficient of relative risk aversion and with
the variance and persistence of the income process. Efficiency gains can be large if one
combines high values of relative risk aversion with large and persistent shocks. However,
for these calibrations we find that most of the efficiency gains are due to the relaxation
of borrowing constraints, rather than to the introduction of savings distortions. These
simulations illustrate our more general methodology and provide some insights into the
2 As a result of equalizing expected consumption growth rates, the perturbed allocation will not feature
an invariant distribution for consumption. Instead, the dispersion in the cross sectional distribution of
consumption grows without bound. This is related to the "immiseration" result found in Atkeson and
Lucas [1992].
determinants of the size of efficiency gains from savings distortions.
Related Literature. This paper relates to several strands of literature. First, there is the op-
timal taxation literature based on models with private information [see Golosov, Tsyvin-
ski, and Werning, 2006, and the references therein]. Papers in this literature usually solve
for the constrained efficient allocations, but few undertake a quantitative analysis of the
efficiency gains due to savings distortions. Two exceptions are Golosov and Tsyvinski
[2006] for disability insurance and Shimer and Werning [2008] for unemployment in-
surance. In both cases, the nature of the stochastic process for shocks allows for a low
dimensional recursive formulation that is numerically tractable. Golosov and Tsyvinski
[2006] provide a quantitative analysis of disability insurance. Disability is modeled as an
absorbing negative skill shock. They calibrate their model and compute the welfare gains
that can be reaped by moving from the most efficient allocation that satisfies free savings
to the optimal allocation. They focus on logarithmic utility and report welfare gains of
0.5%. Shimer and Werning [2008] provide a quantitative analysis of unemployment in-
surance. They consider a sequential job search model, where a risk averse, infinitely lived
worker samples wage offers from a known distribution. Regarding savings distortions,
they show that with CARA utility allowing agents to save freely is optimal. With CRRA
utility, savings distortions are optimal, but they find that the efficiency gains they pro-
vide are minuscule. As most quantitative exercises to date, both Golosov and Tsyvinski
[2006] and Shimer and Werning [2008] are set in partial equilibrium settings with linear
technologies.
Second, following the seminal paper by Aiyagari [1994], there is a vast literature
on incomplete-market Bewley economies within the context of the neoclassical growth
model. These papers emphasize the role of consumers self-smoothing through the pre-
cautionary accumulation of risk-free assets. In most positive analyses, government policy
is either ignored or else a simple transfer and tax system is included and calibrated to cur-
rent policies. In some normative analyses, some reforms of the transfer system, such as
the income tax or social security, are evaluated numerically [e.g. Conesa and Krueger,
2005]. Our paper bridges the gap between the optimal-tax and incomplete-market litera-
tures by evaluating the importance of the constrained-inefficiencies in the latter.
The notion of efficiency used in the present paper is often termed constrained-efficiency,
because it imposes the incentive-compatibility constraints that arise from the assumed
asymmetry of information. Within exogenously incomplete-market economies, a distinct
notion of constrained-efficiency has emerged [see Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis, 1985].
The idea is roughly whether, taking the available asset structure as given, individuals
could change their trading positions in such a way that generates a Pareto improvement
at the resulting market-clearing prices. This notion has been applied by Davila, Hong,
Krusell, and Rios-Rull [2005] to Aiyagari's [1994] setup. They show that, in this sense, the
resulting competitive equilibrium is inefficient. In this paper we also apply our method-
ology to examine an efficiency property of the equilibrium in Aiyagari's [1994] model, but
it should be noted that our notion of constrained efficiency, which is based on preserving
incentive-compatibility, is very different.
2 A Two-Period Economy with Linear Technology
We start with a simple two-period economy with linear technology and then extend the
concepts to an infinite horizon setting with general technologies.
Preferences. There are two periods t = 0,1. Agents are ex ante identical. We focus on
symmetric allocations. Consumption takes place in both periods, while work occurs only
in period t — 1. Agents obtain utility
v = U(c ) + pE [U( Cl ) -V(m-r0)]. . (1)
where U is the utility function from consumption, V is the disutility function from effec-
tive units of labor (hereafter: labor for short) and E is the expectations operator.
Uncertainty is captured by an individual shock 9 G that affects the disutility of
effective units of labor, where is an interval of R. We will sometimes refer to 9 as a skill
shock. To capture the idea that uncertainty is idiosyncratic, we assume that a version of
the law of large number holds so that for any function / on 0, E [f] corresponds to the
average of / across agents.
The utility function U is assumed increasing, concave and continuously differentiable.
We assume that the disutility function V is continuously differentiable and that, for any
9 G 0, the function V(-,9) is increasing and convex. We also assume the single crossing
property that -^-V (n\; 9) is strictly decreasing in 9, so that a high shock 9 indicates a low
disutility from work.
Incentive-Compatibility. The shock realizations are private information to the agent, so
we must ensure that allocations are incentive compatible. By the revelation principle we
can consider, without loss of generality, a direct mechanism where agents report their
shock realization 9 in period f = 1 and are assigned consumption and labor as a function
of this report. The agent's strategy is a mapping cr : —» where cr{9) denotes the
report made when the true shock is 9. The truth telling strategy is denoted by cr*
,
which
is defined by a* (9) = 9 for all 9 G 0.
It is convenient to change variables and define an allocation by the triplet {w0/ u\, ri\ }
with mq = ti(co)/ U\(B) = U(ci(9)). Incentive compatibility requires that truth-telling be
optimal:
a* eargmax{wo + iSE[Ml (cr(0))-y(n 1 (cr(0));0)]}.
Let 6* be an arbitrary point in 0. The single crossing property implies that incentive
compatibility is equivalent to the condition that n\ be non-decreasing and
u 1 (e)^V(n 1(9),9)=Mn-VM9*),e*)+ / -Tj(ni(0);0))<& (2)
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Technology. We assume that technology is linear with labor productivity in period t = 1
equal to w and a rate of return on savings equal to q~ l . The resource constraints are
c(w )+/c! <kQ (3)
^[€(^{6)) - wmtf)] < q-% (4)
where c = U~ l is the inverse of the utility function.
For an allocation to satisfy both resource constraints with equality the required level
of initial capital ko must be
feo = c(«o) + <?E [c(ui(6)) - wni(0)]
.
In what follows, we refer to ko as the cost of the allocation.
Perturbations. Given a utility level v and a non-decreasing labor assignment {n\ }, incen-
tive compatibility and the requirement that the allocation deliver utility v determines a set
of allocations T {{n\ }, v). Indeed, this set has a simple structure. Substituting equation (2)
into equation (1) implies that
M o + j6«i(0*) =0 + j6V , (n1 (0*) / 0*)-0E
'8* d6
For given v and {n\}, the right hand side is fixed. For any value of uq this equation
can be seen as determining the value of U\{6*). Equation (2) then determines the entire
assignment {wi}. Thus, elements of T({rii},v) are uniquely determined by the value
of Wo-
It is useful to restate this property as a perturbation. Given a baseline allocation
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{mo, wi,«i} G r ({rci},u), any other allocation {wo, Wi,ni} G T ({ni},u) satisfies
u = uq - jSA and Uj (0) = w : (0) + A for all 9 G 0,
for some AgR. The reverse is also true, for any baseline allocation in T({ni }, v) and any
AElRa utility assignment constructed in this way is part of an allocation mT({n\},v).
Note that the construction of this perturbation is independent of the labor assignment
{tti }. To reflect this denote this corresponding set of utility assignments by Y( { uq, U\ }, 0) =
{{uq — j6A,«i + A} | A € R}. This notation captures the following point. For the pur-
poses of describing all possible utility assignments consistent with a labor assignment
{ii\), knowledge of the labor assignment itself and the disutility function V can be re-
placed by knowledge of some baseline utility assignment. 3
Free-Savings and Euler equation. The allocation {uQ,U\,ni] is part of a free-savings
equilibrium with natural borrowing limits if and only if truth telling and saving zero is
optimal:
(<7*,0) € argmax {u{c (u ) - k) + jSE \u (c («i (or (9))) + q~ l k] - V (n x [a (9)); 6)} }
(a,k) *• l V / J J
(5)
For short, we say that the allocation satisfies free-savings. Free-savings implies incentive
compatibility and the Euler equation
tf(c(u ))=to- 1E[U, (c(u1 .(e)))] (6)
The converse is not generally true, these two conditions are not sufficient for free-savings.
However, for a given labor assignment {n-y} and utility level v, the utility assignments
{uq, mi} are uniquely determined by incentive compatibility, the requirement that the al-
location deliver expected utility v and the Euler equation. That is, there exists a unique
3A note on our notation is in order. We model shocks as continuous, i.e. is an interval of R, but do not
necessarily assume that n has full support on 0. When it does not, our notation still requires defining the
allocation for values of 9 outside the support. Thus, we distinguish allocations that coincide on the support
of 7T, but differ elsewhere. This is absolutely without loss of generality, but plays a role in the definitions of
T({ni},v) and Y({u ,wi},0).
For example, consider the case where the support of n is composed of a finite set of points, so that 6
belongs to a finite set with probability one. This 'finite shock' setting is often adopted as a simplifying
assumption. In this case, one could define the allocation as a finite vector, with elements corresponding
to the points in the support of K. However, with this alternative representation, there can exist two utility
assignments, {u§,u{\ and {uq,u\}, that, together with {«i} are incentive compatible, but are not obtained
from one another through the parallel perturbations we described. To see why this is consistent with the
notation we adopt, note that in this case it is possible to define various labor assignments on that coincide
on the finite support of 0. For each of these, our representation of all possible utility assignments T {{n\},v)
holds.
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allocation in T {{n\],v) that satisfies the Euler equation. For any given assignment {ni}
the resulting allocation may or may not satisfy free savings. We denote by D(v) the set of
labor assignments that are compatible with free savings, given utility v.
Efficiency and The Inverse Euler Equation. Consider the allocation {uq, U\, n\ } in T {{n\ }, v)
with the minimal cost - the most efficient allocation in T ({n-i },v). This allocation is
uniquely determined by the requirement that {uo,Ui,ni} € T({ni},v) and the follow-
ing first order condition
1 X
.E
w(c(u )) fa~ r
1
W (c.(ui (6))) (7)
Equation (7) is the so called Inverse Euler equation.
It is useful to contrast equation (7) with the standard Euler equation (6). Jensen's
inequality to equation (18) implies that at the optimum
lf(c(uo)<Pq- 1B[U,(c(ui(0)))] l (8)
as long as consumption at t + 1 is uncertain condition on information at t. This shows
that equation (7) is incompatible with equation (6). Thus, the minimal cost allocation
{uo,Ui,tii} in Y({ni},v) cannot allow agents to save freely at the technology's rate of
return, since then equation (6) would hold as a necessary condition, which is incompatible
with the planner's optimality condition, equation (7).
For any allocation, define t G 1R by
• U , (c(uQ))=q- 1 (l-T)TE[U'(c(u 1 {e)))],
a measure of the distortion in the Euler equation that is sometimes referred to as the
intertemporal wedge or implicit tax on savings. 4 If equation (7) holds then t > 0.
Efficiency Gains. Given a utility level v and a labor assignment {ri\}, we define the
following cost functions
X{{ni},v)= min {c{uQ ) + qE [c(ui(9)) - wn^B))}
{M ,u 1/n 1 }er({n 1 } /z')
X
E({ni},v)= . min {c(Uo) + qlE[c(ui(6)) —wni(6)]} s.t. equation (6)
{u ,u1 ,n 1 }sr({ni},u)
The first minimization implies that the corresponding allocation satisfies the Inverse Eu-
*We do not concern ourselves here with explicit tax systems that implement efficient allocations.
t\
A(andB/ /
\A'
c
Figure 1: On the bottom left panel, the labor assignments corresponding to the minimum
of the upper frontier is in D(v). On the top right panel, the labor assignment correspond-
ing to the minimum of the lower frontier is in D(v). On the top left panel, both labor
assignments are in D(v). On the bottom right panel, none of these labor assignments is
in DO).
ler equation. Given the discussion above, the second minimization takes place over a
singleton—the allocation is determined by the constraints. By definition, it satisfies the
Euler equation. Thus, the allocations behind these two costs satisfy, respectively, the In-
verse Euler and standard Euler equations.
The Euler equation acts as an additional constraint in the second minimization. There-
fore, the difference between these cost functions
X
E ({ni},v)-x{{ni} f v) (9)
is positive and captures the efficiency cost of imposing the Euler equation. Whenever
{fti} £ D(v), this coincides with the cost of imposing free savings. This cost difference
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(9) can hence also be interpreted as a measure of the efficiency gains from optimal savings
distortions, and is the main focus of the paper. It has a number of desirable properties.
First, our measure of efficiency gains can be computed by a simple perturbation method.
Indeed, consider the allocation {uo,Ui,n-[} G r({ni},i;) that satisfies the Euler equation.
By definition, its cost is X
E
({n i}> v )- As discussed above, allocations in Y({ni},v) can be
obtained through simple perturbations Y({«0/Wi}/0) = {{wo — jSA, ii\ + A} A e R}
of the baseline utility assignment {uq, u{) while fixing the labor assignment {ni}. Within
this class of perturbations, there exists a unique perturbed utility assignment { Uq, U\ } that
satisfies the Inverse Euler equation. Efficiency gains (9) are given by
X
E ({ni},v) - x({ni},v) = c{u ) - c(u ) + qE [c( Ml (0)) - c{u x )] . (10)
Second, given the baseline utility assignment {uq,Ui}, no knowledge of either the
labor assignment {n\\ or the disutility of work V is needed in order to compute our mea-
sure of efficiency gains. In other words, one does not need to take a stand on how elastic
work effort is to changes in incentives. More generally one does not need to take a stand
on whether the problem is one of private information regarding skills or of moral haz-
ard regarding effort, etc. This robustness is a crucial advantage since current empirical
knowledge of these characteristics and parameters is limited and controversial. The ef-
ficiency gains (9) address precisely the question of whether the intertemporal allocation
of consumption is efficient, without taking a stand on how correctly tradeoff between
insurance and incentives has been resolved.-
Third, as this paper will show, the magnitude of the efficiency gains (9) is determined
by some rather intuitive properties involving both partial equilibrium and general equi-
librium considerations: the relative variance of consumption changes, the coefficient of
relative risk aversion and the concavity of the production function.
Finally, we now show how (9) is informative about more encompassing measures of
efficiency gains that also allow for changes in the labor assignment {n\).
Decomposition and Bounds. Suppose the economy is initially constrained by free sav-
ings. Suppose further that, subject to this restriction, the allocation is efficient. This is
5The robustness properties of the allocations in T ( {n\ }, v), and hence of our measure of efficiency gains,
can be more formally described as follows. Consider the set Q({uq, U\,ri\ }, v) of disutility functions V with
the following properties: V is continuously differentiable; for any 9 6 0, the function V{-,9) is increasing
and convex; V has the single crossing property that ^- V {n\,9) is strictly decreasing in 9 and equation (2)
holds. Theset of allocations T ({n\},v) is the largest of allocations such that for all V G D.({uo,ui,ni},v),
incentive compatibility (2) and promise keeping (1) hold.
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represented by point A in the figure, with labor assignment
{nf } £ argmin^ £ ({?7 1 },z;) s.t. {n^ £ D(v).
Now consider lifting the restriction of free savings and allowing the optimal savings dis-
tortions, as described by the Inverse Euler equation. The new efficient allocation is repre-
sented by point C, with labor assignment {nf } £ argminj,^} x({nl}' v)- The move from
A to C lowers costs by
xH{nt} / v)- X({n^},v)=xH{nthv)-xH{n!},v)+xH{n B1 } f v)-x({ncl } / v).
The first term X
E
({ n\}> v ) ~~ X
E
({ n \ }' v ) captures the move from point A to B, where
{nf} € argminr Ml } X
E
{{ ni}' v )- ^ represents the potential gains from removing the con-
straint {n\} £ D(v), but maintaining the Euler equation. The second term, X
E
({ n i }' v )
~
x{{ n\}> v )> captures the move from point B to point C. It represents the gains obtained
from allowing optimal savings distortions, so that the Inverse Euler equation may be sat-
isfied.
This decomposition emphasizes that savings distortions may be valuable for two qual-
itatively distinct reasons. First, the set of implementable labor assignments is enlarged.
Second, for any labor assignment, perturbing the consumption assignment to satisfy the
Inverse Euler equation, as opposed to the Euler equation, reduces costs. To the best of our
knowledge, this decomposition is novel.
Note that the first source of efficiency gains may not be present. This is the case
whenever {nf} £ D(v), so that points A and B coincide. These cases are shown in
the top left and bottom left panels of the figure. Indeed, in numerical simulations we
found that this is the typical case for standard utility functions and distributions n. In
particular, we adopted iso-elastic utility and disutility functions U(c) = c l ~a / (\ — a)
and V(n;6) = oc(n/6) 7 . As for n, we tried various classes of continuous distribution,
including uniform, log-normal, exponential, and Pareto. For a given specification and
parameters, we first computed the analogue of point B, by solving a planning problem
that minimized cost subject to the Euler equation, incentive compatibility and promise
keeping. 6 We then verified that this allocation was compatible with free savings, so that
{wf } £ D(v), by verifying condition (5) directly. We tried a wide range of preference and
distribution parameters for these classes. In all cases, we found that {nf} £ D(v), so that
the first source of efficiency gains was found to be nil.
6This can also be thought of as a "first order approach" for solving point A. In the next step, we check
that A and B coincide, verifying the validity of the first order approach.
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Of course, there are examples where this source of gains is positive. One such example
is the case with finite shocks. However, our numerical findings with standard continu-
ous distributions, where the gains are nil, suggest that conclusions based on finite shock
examples, should be interpreted with caution. More work is needed to understand pre-
cisely the situations where this source of gains is nonzero, to determine the plausibility
of these scenarios. In any case, this first source of efficiency gains is not the focus of this
paper and we will not explore this issue further.
In contrast to the first source, the second source of efficiency gains is always present,
since X
E
({ n i }> v ) ~ X({ n i }' v ) > as l°ng as consumption is uncertain, so that the Inverse
and Euler equation and the Euler equation are incompatible.
This two-period, linear technology example is tractable. In particular, points A, B
and C can be computed numerically. However, in the rest of the paper we are interested
in environments with concave technologies and an infinite horizon, with productivity
modeled as a stochastic process. For these dynamic extensions, computing the analogues
of points A, B and C is not tractable, except for some special cases such as i.i.d. or fully
persistent shocks. However, note that
**({*?},*) -x({nf},v) < ^({n?},*) -*({nf}}v) < *E ({nf },v) - X({nf },v).
This shows that knowledge of the vertical distance between the two cost functions xE {{n i }> v
x({ n i}' v ) is informative about the second source of efficiency gains.
3 Infinite Horizon
In this section, we lay down our general environment. We then describe a class perturba-
tions that preserve incentive compatibility. These perturbations serve as the basis for our
method to compute efficiency gains.
3.1 The Environment
We cast our model within a general Mirrleesian dynamic economy. Our formulation is
closest to Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski [2003]. This paper obtains the Inverse
Euler equation [e.g. Diamond and Mirrlees, 1977] in a general dynamic Mirrlees economy,
where agents' privately observed skills evolve as a stochastic process.
Preferences. Our economy is populated by a continuum of agent types indexed by i G I
distributed according to the measure ip. Preferences generalize those used in Section 2
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and are summarized by the expected discounted utility
oo
t=Q
E ! is the expectations operator for type i.
Additive separability between consumption and leisure is a feature of preferences that
we adopt because it is required for the arguments leading to the Inverse Euler equation. 7
Idiosyncratic uncertainty is captured by an individual specific shock 9\ G 0, where
as in Section 2, is an interval of the real line. These shocks affect the disutility of ef-
fective units of labor. We sometimes refer to them as skill shocks. The stochastic process
for each individual 9\ is identically distributed within each type i G I and independently
distributed across all agents. We denote the history up to period t by 9 l,t = (9 lQ , 9\, . . . , 0\),
and by n l the probability measure on 00 corresponding to the law of the stochastic pro-
cess 6\ for an agent of type i.
Given any function / on 00 , we denote the integral f f(9
l
'
co)dn(6 1 '00 ) using the ex-
pectation notation E'|/(^,co )] or simply E f [/]. Similarly, we write E i [f(9 i'°°)\9 i ' t - 1 } / or
simply E[_
1 [f], for the conditional expectation of/ given history 9
l,t~ l G f .
As in Section 2, all uncertainty is idiosyncratic and we assume that a version of the law
of large number holds so that for any function / on 0°°, E' [/] corresponds to the average
of / across agents with type i.
To preview the use we will have for types i G I, note that in our numerical implemen-
tation we will assume that skills follow a Markov process. We will consider allocations
that result from a market equilibrium where agents save in a riskless asset. For this kind
of economy, agent types are then initial asset holdings together with initial skill. The
measure tp captures the joint distribution of these two variables.
It is convenient to change variables, translating consumption allocation into utility
assignments {u l
t (9
i,t
)} / where u\(9
1,t
)
= U(c\(9 l,t )). This change of variable will make in-
centive constraints linear and render the planning problem that we will introduce shortly
convex. Then, agents of type i G I with allocation {u\} and {n\} obtain utility
v
l
= X> fE< i4(0tt) - V(nf(0''');0i)
f=0
(11)
Information and Incentives. The shock realizations are private information to the agent.
7 The intertemporal additive separability of consumption also plays a role. However, the intertemporal
additive separability of work effort is completely immaterial: we could replace YT=Q /5
f
E[V(rct;#t)] with
some general disutility function V({nt}).
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We invoke the revelation principle to derive the incentive constraints by considering a
direct mechanism. Agents are allocated consumption and labor as a function of the entire
history of reports. The agent's strategy determines a report for each period as a function
of the history, {cr\ {0 hi )}- The incentive compatibility constraint requires that truth-telling,
cf*(0f-') =9\, be optimal:
oo • oo
£/5'E''[i4(0*) - V{n\{d^);e\)} > Yj^WM 1*^)) - V{n\{^{e^));e\)} (12)
f=0 t=o
for all reporting strategies {&[} and all i G I.
Technology. Let Q and Nt represent aggregate capital, labor and consumption for period
t, respectively. That is, letting c = LI-1 denote the inverse of the utility function,
Q =
J
E f c(u\) dip
Nt = f E' nj #
for t = 0, 1, . . . In order to facilitate our efficiency gains calculations, it will prove conve-
nient to index the the resource constraints by et which represents the aggregate amount
of resources that is being economized in every period. The resource constraints are then
%! + Q + et < (1 - S)K t + F(K t , Nt ) t = 0,l,... (13)
where Kt denotes aggregate capital. The function F(K, N) is assumed to be homogenous
of degree one, concave and continuously differentiable, increasing in K and N.
Two cases are of particular interest. The first is the neoclassical growth model, where
F(K, N) is strictly concave and satisfies Inada conditions Fj<(0, N) = oo and F^(oo, N) = 0.
In this case, we also impose Kt > 0. The second case has linear technology F(K, N) =
N + (q~ l — 1)K, S = and < q < 1. One interpretation is that output is linear in labor
with productivity normalized to one, and a linear storage technology with safe gross rate
of return q~ l is available. Another interpretation is that this represents the economy-
wide budget set for a partial equilibrium analysis, with constant interest rate 1 + r = q~ l
and unit wage. Under either interpretation, we avoid corners by allowing capital to be
negative up to the present value of future output, K
t+\ > — J2T=i 9
sM+s- This represents
the natural borrowing limit and allows us to summarize the constraints on the economy
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by the single present-value condition
00 00
-|
E<?'Q< j>'(Nt-«t) + -Ko-
f=0 t=o 9
Moral Hazard Extension. We could extend our framework to incorporate moral hazard
in addition to private information. For example, each period agents could choose an
unobservable action e\ that creates additively separable disutility. Effective labor, n\, is a
function of the history of effort and shocks n\ = ft{el,t , 1,f ). In addition, the distribution
over skill shocks may be affected by the sequence of effort, so that the distribution of 6 l,t
depends on the effort choices eht ~ l .
Although we will not pursue in further detail the notation required to formalize this
type of model, all our subsequent analysis extends to such a setting. Indeed, our numeri-
cal applications may also be interpreted this way. This is important to keep in mind, since
a hybrid model like this one seems more realistic than a model focusing exclusively on
private information, as in the standard Mirrlees model.
Feasibility. An allocation {u\,n\,Kt,et} and utility profile {v 1 } is feasible if conditions
(11)—(13) hold. That is, feasible allocations that deliver utility v l to agent of type i G I,
must be incentive compatible and resource feasible.
Free Savings. For the purposes of this paper, an important benchmark is the case where
agents can save, and perhaps also borrow, freely. This increases the choices available to
agents, which adds further restrictions relative to the incentive compatibility constraints.
In this scenario, the government enforces labor and taxes as a function of the his-
tory of reports, but does not control consumption directly. Disposable after-tax income
is Wtn\(al,t (9 ht )) — Tl(crl,t (6ht )).8 Agents face the following sequence of budget and bor-
rowing constraints:
4(0^) +4+1 (<9z>) < wtrbip1'*^)) - Tlia 1 ' 1^)) + (1 + rt)4(^_1 ) (14a)
.i+1(^)>^+1 (^(^)) (ub)
with a lQ given. We allow the borrowing limits fl|+1 (#
z
'
f
) to be tighter than the natural
borrowing limits.
Agents with type i maximize utility E^o^'KC^'^^'O) - V(nj(0- z"' f (0 f ' f ));0|)] by
8A special case of interest is where the dependence of the tax on any history of reports 9 l,t , can be
expressed through its effect on the history of labor n l ' t (9 l,t ). That is, when 7](0 ! ' f ) = T l
t
'"(n 1,t (9'' t )) for some
T/'" function.
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choosing a reporting, consumption and saving strategy {u^c],^^} subject to the se-
quence of constraints (14), taking a' and {n\,T\,Wt,r t } as given. A feasible allocation
{u\,n\,Kt,et} is part of a free-savings equilibrium if there exist taxes {T\}, such that
the optimum {crl,c\,a lt+1 } for agent of type i with wages and interest rates given by
w t = FN (K t,Nt ) and rt = FK (K t,Nt ) - 5 satisfies truth telling crj(0 f ' f ) = 0} and gener-
ates the utility assignment u
\
(0''*) = I7(c|(# f ' f )). 9
At a free-savings equilibrium, the incentive compatibility constraints (12) are satis-
fied. The consumption-savings choices of agents impose additional further restrictions.
In particular, a necessary condition is the intertemporal Euler condition
Lr(c(uS)).>0(l + rt+1 )Ei W(c(u\+l )) (15)
with equality if a\
+l {6
ht
) > a
l
t+1 (6
1
'
t
). Note that if the borrowing limits a lt+1 (9
1,t
) are
equal to the natural borrowing limits, then the Euler equation (15) always holds with an
equality.
Efficiency. We say that the allocation {u\,n\,Kt,et) and utility profile {v 1 } is dominated
by the alternative {u l
t
,n
l
t/
Kt/ e t } and {v 1 }, if v 1 > v 1 , Kq < Kq, e t < St for all periods t and
either v 1 > v 1 for a set of agent types of positive measure, Kq < Kq or et < St for some
period t.
We say that a feasible allocation is efficient if it is not dominated by any feasible alloca-
tion. We say that an allocation is conditionally efficient if it is not dominated by a feasible
with the same labor allocation n\ = h\.
As explained in Section 2, allocations that are part of a free-savings equilibrium are not
conditionally efficient. Conditionally efficient allocations satisfy a first order condition,
the Inverse Euler equation, which is inconsistent with the Euler equation. Being part
of a free-savings equilibrium therefore acts as a constraint on the optimal provision of
incentives and insurance. Efficiency gains can be reaped by departing from free-savings.
3.2 Incentive Compatible Perturbations
In this section, we develop a class of perturbations of the allocation of consumption that
preserve incentive compatibility. We then introduce a concept of efficiency, A-efficiency,
that corresponds to the optimal use of these perturbations. Our perturbation set is large
enough to ensure that every A-efficient allocation satisfies the Inverse Euler equation.
9Note that individual asset holdings are not part of this definition. This is convenient because asset
holdings and taxes are indeterminate due to the usual Ricardian equivalence argument.
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Moreover, we show that A-efficiency and conditional efficiency are closely related con-
cepts: A-efficiency coincides with conditional efficiency on allocations that satisfy some
mild regularity conditions. Finally we derive some properties of A-efficient allocations
with constant aggregates, which we term steady-states, in the case where the utility func-
tion is of the CRRA form.
A Class of Perturbations. For any period t and history 9 l,t a feasible perturbation, of
any baseline allocation, is to decrease utility at this node by (5A 1 and compensate by in-
creasing utility by A ! in the next period for all realizations of 6>|
+1 . Total lifetime util-
ity is unchanged. Moreover, since only parallel shifts in utility are involved, incentive
compatibility of the new allocation is preserved. We can represent the new allocation as
ffj(0«>) = j4(6^) - 0A 1', u it+1 (9
i
'
t+l
) = u
i
t+1 {9
i
'
t+1
) + A 1', for all 9\+v
This perturbation changes the allocation in periods t and t + 1 after history 9 l,t only.
The full set of variations generalizes this idea by allowing perturbations of this kind at all
nodes:
. wj(6> f ) = i4(6>
f
) + A^" 1 ) - jSAf (0 f'f )
for all sequences of {A l {9 1,t )} such that u lt (9 l,f ) G li(!R+) and such that the limiting con-
dition
lim £
TE'[AV'V'T ))] =
T—»co
for all reporting strategies {c\}. This condition rules out Ponzi-like schemes in utility. 10
By construction, the agent's expected utility, for any strategy {&]}, is only changed by a
constant A z
_v
OO 00
Y,^MWi't¥'t ))] = EjSfE f [w|((7f'f (0 l''f ))] + A!_ 1 . (16)
t=0 t=0
It follows directly from equation (12) that the baseline allocation {u\} is incentive com-
patible if and only if the new allocation {u\} is incentive compatible. Note that the value
of the initial shifter A'_
1
determines the lifetime utility of the new allocation relative to its
baseline. Indeed, for any fixed infinite history 9 1,0° equation (16) implies that (by substi-
tuting the deterministic strategy o\(dl,t ) — 9\)
OO 00
£ p'filcs'"'*) = YL faffi*) + A -i v^',co e 0CO (17)
10 Note that the limiting condition is trivially satisfied for all variations with finite horizon: sequences
for {A'
t
} that are zero after some period T. This was the case in the discussion of a perturbation at a single
node and its successors.
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Thus, ex-post realized utility is the same along all possible realizations for the shocks. 11
Let Y({u^} / A'_ 1 ) denote the set of utility allocations {u\} that can be generated by
these perturbations starting from a baseline allocation {u\} for a given initial A l
__v This is
a convex set.
Below, we show that these perturbation are rich enough to deliver the Inverse Euler
equation. In this sense, they fully capture the characterization of optimality stressed by
Golosov et al. [2003].
An allocation {u\, n\, Kt, et] with utility profile {v 1 } is A-efficient if it is feasible and not
dominated by another feasible allocation {u\,n l
t
,Kt,et} such that {u\} G Y({u\], A^).
Note that conditional efficiency implies A-efficiency, since both concepts do not allow
for changes in the labor allocation. Under mild regularity conditions, the converse is also
true. More precisely, in Appendix A, we define the notion of regular utility and labor as-
signments {u\, n\}.12 We then show that A-efficiency coincides with conditional efficiency
on the class of allocations with regular utility and labor assignments. Indeed, given a reg-
ular utility and labor assignment {u\, n\}, the perturbations Y({u\}, A l
_^ characterize all
the utility assignments {u\} such that {u\,n\} is regular and satisfies the incentive com-
patibility constraints (12).
We will shortly present a methodology to compute the efficiency gains from restoring
A-efficiency. We refer the reader to the discussion in Section 2 for an extensive motivation
of this question.
Inverse Euler equation. Building on Section 2, we review briefly the Inverse Euler equa-
tion which is the optimality condition for any A-efficient allocation.
Proposition 1. A set of necessary and sufficient conditions for an allocation {u\, n\, Kt, et) to be
A-efficient is given by
c'(u\) = qJE\[c'(u't+1 )} <^ 77^-- = % Ej iTtfJA - . (18)
1
s ^ —
1
LT'(c(«i)) U'(c(u\+l ))_
= FK(Kt+1,Nt)-5
where q t = 1/(1 + r t ) and
r t = l/ S (19)
is the technological rate of return.
11 The converse is nearly true: by taking appropriate expectations of equation (17) one can deduce equa-
tion (16), but for a technical caveat involving the possibility of inverting the order of the expectations op-
erator and the infinite sum (which is always possible in a version with finite horizon and finite). This
caveat is the only difference between equation (16) and equation (17).
12 Regularity is a mild technical assumption which is necessary to derive an Envelope condition crucial
for our proof.
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A A-efficient allocation cannot allow agents to save freely at the technology's rate of
return, since then equation (15) would hold as a necessary condition, which is incompat-
ible with the planner's optimality condition, equation (18).
Another implication of the Inverse Euler equation (18) concerns the interest rates that
prevail at steady states for A-efficient allocations. We refer to allocations {u\,n\,Kt,e t }
with constant aggregates Q = Css , Nt = Nss , Kt = Kss and e t = ess as steady states.
At a steady state, the discount factor is constant q t = qss = 1/(1 + rss ) where rss =
Fk(Kss , Nss ) — 5. Note that our notion of a steady state is only a condition on aggregate
variables. It does not presume that individual consumption is constant nor that there is
an invariant distribution for the cross section of consumption.
Suppose the utility function is of the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) form, so
thatll(c) = c1-cr /(l — a) for some (7 > 0. The Inverse Euler equation is then EJ[c(w !f+1 )
<7
]
=
(fi/ clss)c{u\)
CT
. When a = 1, this implies C t+\ = (j5/qss )Ct, so that aggregate consump-
tion is constant if and only if /S =
^ss
. For a > 1, Jensen's inequality implies that
Q+i < (p/qss ) 1/a Ct, so that ft < qss is inconsistent with a steady state. The argument
for <7 < 1 is symmetric.
Proposition 2. Suppose CRRA preferences U(c) = c1_cr /(l — a) with a > 0. Then at a steady
statefor a A-efficient allocation
(i) if a > 1 then qss < /3 and rss > /3
-1
- 1
(ii) ifcr<l then qss > /S and rss < j6
-1
— 1
This result can be contrasted with the properties of steady state equilibria in incom-
plete markets models, where agents are allowed to save freely at the technological rate of
return. As shown by Aiyagari [1994], in such cases, the steady state interest rate is always
lower than the discount rate 1//5 — 1.
4 Efficiency Gains
In this section we consider a baseline allocation and consider an improvement on it that
yields a A-efficient allocation. We define a metric for efficiency gains from this improve-
ment. This leads us to a planning problem to compute these gains. We then show how
to solve this planning problem. In particular, we work with a relaxed planning problem
that allows us to break up the solution into component planning problems. Moreover, we
show how these problems may admit a recursive representation. Indeed, in the logarith-
mic case we find a closed-form solution. More generally, we show that each component
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planning problem is mathematically isomorphic to solving an income fluctuations prob-
lem where At plays the role of wealth.
4.1 Planning Problem
If an allocation {u l
t
,n\,Kt,et} with corresponding utility profile {v 1 }, is not A-efficient,
then we can always find an alternative allocation {u\,n\,Kt,et} that leaves utility un-
changed, so that v l = v l for all i £ I, but economizes on resources: Kq < Kq and et < e t
with at least one strict inequality. In the rest of the paper, we restrict to cases where et = 0,
KQ = Kq and e t = AQ for some A > 0. We then take A as our measure of efficiency gains
between these allocations. This measure represents the resources that can be saved in all
periods in proportion to aggregate consumption.
We now introduce a planning problem that uses this metric to compute the distance
of any baseline allocation from the A-efficient frontier. For any given baseline allocation
{u\, n\, Kt , 0}, which is feasible with e t = for all t > 0, we seek to maximize A by finding
an alternative allocation {u\, n\,Kt , AQ} with Kq = Ko,
Kf+ i + J W [c(u\))dip + AQ <{l-5)Kt + F(Kt/ Nt ) t = 0,l,... (20)
and
K}GY(K},0).
Let Q = J*E z [c(u|)]<ii/> denote aggregate consumption under the optimized allocation.
The optimal allocation {u\, n\, Kt, XCt} in this program is A-efficient and saves an amount
AQ *of aggregate resources in every period. Our measure of the distance of the baseline
allocation from the A-efficient frontier is A.
4.2 Relaxed Problem
We now construct a relaxed planning problem that replaces the resource constraints with
a single present value condition. This problem is indexed by a sequence of intertemporal
prices or interest rates, which encodes the scarcity of aggregate resources in every pe-
riod. The relaxed planning problem can be further decomposed in a series of component
planning problems corresponding to the different types i G /.
Given some positive intertemporal prices {Qt} with the normalization that ]2t=Q QtQ =
1 we replace the sequence of resource constraints (20) with the single present value con-
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dition
A=EQ( (F(Kt/ Nt ) + (1 - S)Kt - Kt+1 - J E
!
[c(flj)] dip) (21)
which is obtained by multiplying equation (20) by Qt and summing over t = 0, 1, . .
.
Formally, the relaxed planning problem seeks the allocation {u\,n l
t
,K t,XCt} where {u\} <G
Y({u\},0) that maximizes A given by equation (21).
The connection with the original planning problem is the following. Suppose that,
given some {Qt}, the optimal allocation {u\, n\, Kt, AQ} for the relaxed problem satisfies
the resource constraints (20). Then, this allocation solves the original planning problem.
This relaxed problem approach is adapted from Farhi and Werning [2007] and is related
to the first welfare theorem proved in Atkeson and Lucas [1992].
The converse is also true. Indeed, the prices {Qt} are Lagrange multipliers and La-
grangian necessity theorems guarantee the existence of prices {Qt} for the relaxed prob-
lem. The following lemma, which follows immediately from Theorem 1, Section 8.3 in
Luenberger [1969], provides one such result.
Lemma 1. Suppose {u\, n\, K t , AQ } solves the planning problem and the resource constraints (20)
hold with equality. Then there exists a sequence ofprices {Qt} such that this same allocation solves
the relaxed planning problem.
The relaxed planning problem can be decomposed into a subproblem for capital {Kt
}
and a series of component planning problems for the utility assingment {u[}. The sub-
problem for capital maximizes the right hand side of equation (21) with respect to {Kt+i}.
The first-order conditions, which are necessary and sufficient for an interior optimum, are
l=q t {FK (Kt+l,Nt+1 ) + l-5) £ = 0,1,...
where qt = Qt+i/Qt- This, together with the normalization that Yl'tLo QfQ = L implies a
one-to-one relationship between {Kt+i} and {Qt}-
The component planning problem for type i G I maximizes the right hand side of
equation (21) with respect to the utility assignment {u\} £ Y({u\},0). The objective
reduces to minimizing the present value of consumption:
t=o Qo
c[ul (22)
Each of these component planning problems can be solved independently. Since both the
objective and the constraints are convex it follows immediately that, given {qt}, the first
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order conditions for optimality at an interior solution in the component planning problem
(22) coincide exactly with the Inverse Euler equation (18):
c'(u\) = ^E\[c'(u\+1 )} £ = 0,1,...
4.3 A Bellman Equation
In most situations of interest, the baseline allocation admits a recursive representation for
some endogenous state variable. This is the case whenever {6\} is a Markov process and
the baseline allocation depends on the history of shocks d l,t
~ l in a way that can be sum-
marized by an endogenous state x\, with law of motion x\ = M{x\_ lr 0\) and given initial
condition x' . Note that the transition matrix M is assumed to be independent of i. Types
then correspond to different initial value x lQ . This is the only thing that distinguishes them.
The endogenous state x\ is a function of the history of exogenous shocks 6 l,t . Defining the
state vector s\ = (x\, 6[) there must exist a function u such that u\ (9 l,t ) = u(s\) for all 6 l,t .
In what follows we drop the hat notation and we stop indexing the allocation by the type
i of the agents. We denote a baseline allocation by u(st) and use the notation c(st) for
c(u(s t )).
The requirement that the baseline allocation be recursive in this way is hardly restric-
tive. Of course, the endogenous state and its law of motion depend on the particular
economic model generating the baseline allocation. A leading example in this paper is
the case of incomplete markets Bewley economies in Huggett [1993] and Aiyagari [1994].
In these models, described in more detail in Section 6, each individual is subject to an
exogenous Markov process for income or productivity and saves using a riskless asset.
At a steady state, the interest rate on this asset is constant, so that the agent's solution
can be summarized by a stationary savings rule. The baseline allocation can then be sum-
marized using asset wealth as an endogenous state, with law of motion M given by the
agent's optimal saving rule. 13
For such baseline allocations we can reformulate the component planning problems
recursively as follows.
The idea is to take St as an exogenous process and keep track of the additional lifetime
utility Af_i previously promised as an endogeneous state variable.
For any date r define the continuation plans {nJ}^LQ with uj(s) = n t+ T (s) and the
value function corresponding to the component planning problem starting at date t with
13 Another example are allocations generated by a dynamic contract. The state variable then includes the
promised continuation utility [see Spear and Srivastava, 1987] along with the exogenous state.
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state s
' Qr+t.
K(A_,s;t) = inf£^E [c(Hj) \ sT = s] s.t. {uj} G Y(K},A_).
This value function satisfies the Bellman equation
K(A_,s;t) =min[c(w(s)+A_ - jSA) + qTE[K{A,s';T + 1) | s]l. (23)
A
The optimization over A is one-dimensional and convex and delivers a policy function
g(A-,s;r). Combining the necessary and sufficient first-order condition for A with the
envelope condition yields the Inverse Euler equation in recursive form
c'(u(s) + A_-
i
Sg(A_ / s;T)) = |E[c / (u(s /)+g(A_,s;T)-^(g(A_ / s;T) / s /;T + l)) \ s]
This condition can be used to compute g(-, -;t) for given g(-, -,t + 1).
An optimal plan for {u t } can then be generated from the sequence of policy functions
{<?(/ - / T)} by setting w(s f ) = u(st) + A(sf_1 ) — jSA(s f ) and using the recursion A(s t ) =
g(A(s t ~ 1 ),s t ;t) with initial condition A_! = 0.
With a fixed discount factor q, the value function is independent of time, K(A-,s), and
solves the stationary Bellman equation
K(A_,s) =min[c(u(s) + A_ - jSA) + qE[K(A,s') \s}]. (24)
A
This dynamic program admits an analogy with a consumer's income fluctuation problem
that is both convenient and enlightening. We transform variables by changing signs and
switch the minimization to a maximization. Let A_ = —A^,K{A^;s) = —K( — A_;s)
and U(x) = —c(—x). Note that the pseudo utility function U is increasing, concave
and satisfies Inada conditions at the extremes of its domain. 14 Reexpressing the Bellman
equation (24) using these transformation yields:
K(A-;s) =max\U{-u{s) + A- - jSA) + qE[K(A;s') \s]].
A
This reformulation can be read as the problem of a consumer with a constant discount
14 An important case is when the original utility function is CRRA U(c) = c 1_(T /(l — a) for a > and
c > 0. Then for a > 1 the function U(x) is proportional to a CRRA with coefficient of relative risk aversion
<7 — cr/((r — 1) and x G (0, oo). For u < 1 the pseudo utility U is "quadratic-like", in that it is proportional
to — (— x)P for some p > 1, and x € (— oo,0].
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factor q facing a constant gross interest rate 1 + r — B~
l
,
entering the period with pseudo
financial wealth A_, receives a pseudo labor income shock — u(s). The fictitious consumer
must decide how much to save BA; pseudo consumption is then x = —u(s) + A_ — BA.
The benefit of this analogy is that the income fluctuations problem has been exten-
sively studied and used; it is at the heart of most general equilibrium incomplete market
models [Aiyagari, 1994].
With logarithmic utility, the Bellman equation can be simplified considerably. The idea
is best seen through the analogy, noting that the pseudo utility function is exponential
—e~
x in this case. It is well known that for a consumer with CARA preferences a one
unit increase in financial wealth, A, results in an increase in pseudo-consumption, x, of
r/(l + r) = 1 — /3 in parallel across all periods and states of nature. It is not hard to see
that this implies that the value function takes the form K(A_;s) = e~^~^A ^k(s). These
ideas are behind the following result.
Proposition 3. With logarithmic utility and constant discount a, the value function in equa-
tion (24) is given by
K{A-;s) =e^-®L-k{s) t
wherefunction k{s) solves the Bellman equation
k{s) = Ac(s) 1 -^ (E[fc(s')
| s]f ,
•
(25)
where A = (q/ffi/fa - j6)
1 "^.
The optimal policy for A can be obtainedfrom k(s) using
Proof. See Appendix B. m
This solution is nearly closed form: one needs only compute k(s) using the recursion
in equation (25), which requires no optimization. No simplifications on the stochastic
process for skills are required.
4.4 Idiosyncratic Planning Problem
The full planning problem maximizes over utility assignments and capital. It is useful to
also consider a version of the problem that takes the baseline sequence of capital {Kt } as
25
given. Thus, define the idiosyncratic planning problem as maximizing A 7 subject to
[E i [c{ii i
t
)}dip + X I Ct = Ct £ = 0,1,...
and {u\} G Y({u\},0). The efficiency gains A 1 represent the constant proportional reduc-
tion in consumption that is possible without changing the aggregate sequence of capital.
Of course, the total efficiency gains are larger than the idiosyncratic ones: A > X 1 .
The idiosyncratic planning problem lends itself to a similar analysis. In order to avoid
repetitions, we only sketch the corresponding analysis. We can define a corresponding re-
laxed problem, given a sequence of prices {Qt}- We can also prove an analogue of Lemma
(1). This relaxed planning problem can then be decomposed into a series of component
planning problems. When the baseline allocation is recursive, and given a sequence of
prices {Qt}, we can study the component planning problems using a Bellman equation
as in equation (23). The corresponding first-order conditions also take the form of an
Inverse Euler equation
c
f
(ui) = ^E\[c'(4+1 )] £ = 0,1,... .
where qt = Qt+i/Qt- In other words, the marginal rates of substitution corresponding
to the Inverse Euler equation E !
f
[c'(u\
+1 )/ (/3c'(u[))] must be equalized across types and
histories in every period. These marginal rates of substitution, however, are not neces-
sarily linked to any technological rate of transformation as in equation (19). The idiosyn-
cratic efficiency gains thus correspond to the gains from equalizing the marginal rate of
substitution across types and histories in every period, without changing the sequence of
capital.
5 Idiosyncratic and Aggregate Gains with Log Utility
In this section, we focus on the case of logarithmic utility. We first show that the planning
problem can be decomposed into an Idiosyncratic planning problem and a simple Aggre-
gate planning problem. We then illustrate this result in the simple benchmark case we the
baseline allocation of consumption is a geometric random walk.
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5.1 A Decomposition: Idiosyncratic and Aggregate
When utility is logarithmic, our parallel shifts in utility imply proportional shifts in con-
sumption. This allows us to prove a decomposition result: the efficiency gains A using
a simple Aggregate planning problem involving the idiosyncratic efficiency gains A 7 . It
also makes it possible to solve the idiosyncratic efficiency gains and the corresponding
allocation in closed form when the baseline allocation is recursive and features constant
consumption. In this case, the optimum in the planning problem and the efficiency gains
A can be solved out almost explicitly by combining the solution of the Idiosyncratic prob-
lem with that of the Aggregate planning problem.
Given A 7 6 [0, 1), the Aggregate planning problem seeks to determine the aggregate
allocation {Q, Nt, Kt, AQ} that maximizes A, subject to Ko = Ko,
i
Kt+l +Ct + \Ct <(l-5)Kt + F(Kt , Nt ) t = 0, 1, . .
.
and
00 00
zp tu(c t ) = j:p t u(c t (i-x i ))
t=o t=o
Proposition 4. Consider a baseline allocation {u\, n\,Kt,0} such that Yl'tLo P
f
LI(Ct) is well de-
fined andfinite. Suppose that the optimum in the Idiosyncratic planning problem are such that the
resource constraints hold with equality. Let A 7 denote the idiosyncratic efficiency gains identified
by the Idiosyncratic problem. Then the total efficiency gains A underlying the planning problem
are determined by the Aggregate planning problem.
Proof. See Appendix C. m
The proof of Proposition 4 also establishes that the utility assignment {u\} that solves
the Idiosyncratic planning problem and the utility assignment {u l
t
} that solves the origi-
nal planning problem are related by u\ — u\ + St where St = U(Ct) — LT(Q(1 — A 7 )).
The efficiency gains A can then be decomposed into idiosyncratic efficiency gains X 1
and aggregate efficiency gains XA . Aggregate efficiency gains are simply defined as XA =
A -A 7 .
The analysis of the evolution of the aggregate allocation {Ct,Kt} only requires the
knowledge of A 7
,
but can otherwise be conducted separately from the analysis of the id-
iosyncratic problem. The aggregate planning problem is simply that of a standard deter-
ministic growth model, which, needless to say, is straightforward to solve. For example,
suppose that the baseline allocation represents a steady state with constant aggregates,
Q = Css , Kt = Kss and Nt = Nss . Then the optimized allocation aggregate allocation
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{Ct,Kt } converges to a steady state {CSS,KSS } such that I - 6 + FK (KSS,NSS ) = 1//3 and
Css = F(KSS ) — 5KSs — ACSS - We will put that result to use in Section 6.
Suppose that the baseline allocation is recursive with state s and features constant ag-
gregate consumption Q = Css . It is not necessary for the argument that aggregate capital
Kt and labor Nt be constant at the baseline allocation. The idiosyncratic efficiency gains
can then be easily computed. Propositions 2 implies that we can use cjt = /3 to com-
pute the idiosyncratic allocation. Proposition 3 then allows us to compute the solution in
closed form. This leads to
,
(1 - ft f k{s)dtpA =1
where k(s) solves equation (24) with q = jS. We can then apply Proposition 4 and com-
pute the efficiency gains A and the corresponding A-efficient allocation by solving the
Aggregate planning problem, a version of the neoclassical growth model. This provides a
complete solution to the planning problem when the baseline allocation is recursive and
features constant aggregate consumption.
5.2 Example: Steady States with Geometric Random Walk
Although the main virtue of our approach is that we can flexibly apply it to various base-
line allocations, in this section we begin with a simple and instructive case. We main-
tain the assumption of logarithmic utility throughout. We take the baseline allocation
to be a geometric random walk: St+\ = £t$t 'with, et i.i.d. and c(s) = s, so that u(s) =
U(s). Moreover, we assume that log(e) is normally distributed with variance of so that
E [e] • E [e _1 ] = exp(<r£2 ). We also assume that the baseline allocation represents a steady
state with constant aggregates Q = Css , Kt = Kss and Nt = Nss which require E[e] == 1.
We define rss = Fk(Kss , Nss ) — 5 and qss = 1/(1 + rss ). Moreover, we assume that the Eu-
ler equation holds at the baseline allocation, which requires
^ss
= ^Efs
-1
]
= j5 exp(oj).
Although extremely stylized, a random walk is an important conceptual and em-
pirical benchmark. First, most theories—starting with the simplest permanent income
hypothesis
—
predict that consumption should be close to a random walk. Second, some
authors have argued that the empirical evidence on income, which is a major determinant
for consumption, and consumption itself shows the importance of a highly persistent
component [e.g. Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron, 2004a]. For these reasons, a parsimo-
nious statistical specification for consumption may favor a random walk.
The advantage is that we obtain closed-form solutions for the optimized allocation,
the intertemporal wedge and the efficiency gains. The transparency of the exercise re-
veals important determinants for the magnitude of efficiency gains. A geometric random
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walk however, is special for the following reason. If we apply the decomposition of Sec-
tion 5.1, then the idiosyncratic efficiency gains are zero. The entirety of the efficiency gains
are aggregate. This is because at the baseline allocation, the marginal rates of substitution
Ef [c' (u\+l ) / (fie' (u\))] are already equalized across types and histories to /3
_1
. Therefore,
the sequence of prices {Q t } given by Q t = QojS 1 and Qo = (1 — /3)/Css solve the relaxed
version of the Idiosyncratic problem. These marginal rates of substitution are not equal-
ized, however, to the marginal rate of transformation 1 — 5 + Fk(Kss , Nss ). Therefore, this
section can be seen as an exploration of the determinants of aggregate efficiency gains.
An Example Economy. Indeed, one can construct an example economy where a geomet-
ric random walk for consumption arises as a competitive equilibrium with incomplete
markets. To see this, suppose that individuals have logarithmic utility over consumption
and disutility from labor V(n;9) = v(n/9) for some convex function v(n) over work ef-
fort n, so that 6 can be interpreted as productivity. Skills evolve as a geometric random
walk, so that 6t+ i = £f+i#t, where e f+ i is i.i.d. Individuals can only accumulate a risk-
less asset paying return q~ l equal to the rate of return on the economy's linear savings
technology. They face the sequence of budget constraints
at+i+c t < q~ 1 a t -\-6 tn t t = 0, 1,...
and the borrowing constraint that a t > 0. Suppose the rate of return q~ l is such that
1 > /3g
-1
EJ£
-1
]. Finally, suppose that individuals have no initial assets, so that ciq — 0.
In the competitive equilibrium of this example individuals exert a constant work effort
nss , satisfying nss v'(n ss ) = 1, and consume all their labor income each period, c t = 9tnss ;
no assets are accumulated, at remains at zero. This follows because the construction en-
sured that the agent's intertemporal Euler equation holds at the proposed equilibrium
consumption process. The level of work effort n ss is defined so that the intra-period
consumption-leisure optimality condition holds. Then, since the agent's problem is con-
vex, it follows that this allocation is optimal for individuals. Since the resource constraint
trivially holds, it is an equilibrium.
Although this is certainly a very special example economy, it illustrates that a geomet-
ric random walk for consumption is a possible equilibrium outcome.
Partial Equilibrium: Linear Technology. We first study the case where the technology
is linear with a rate of return q~ l > 1. This imposes q = qss = /3exp(cf ). Note that
q < 1 imposes, for a given discount rate /3, an upper bound on the variance of the shocks
exp(cr£
2
) < jS
-1
.
Since the idiosyncratic efficiency gains X 1 are zero, the solution of the planning prob-
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lem can be derived by studying the Aggregate planning problem, which takes a remark-
ably simple form. The aggregate consumption sequence {Q} that solves the Aggregate
planning problem is given by
Q = Css exp (73-g^J exp(-fcr
2
).
The efficiency gains A and the optimal utility assignment {u} are then readily computed.
We can also derive the intertemporal wedge t that measures the savings distortions at the
optimal allocation U'(c(u(s t )) = /S(l - t^^E [^(c(w(sf+1 )))|s f ].
Proposition 5. Suppose that utility is logarithmic and that the technology is linear. Suppose
that the baseline allocation is a geometric random walk with constant aggregate consumption
Q = Css , that the shocks e are lognormal with variance of and that the Euler equation holds at
the baseline. Then the consumption assignment of the solution of the planning problem is given by
c(s f ) = exp ( i^raof) exp (—tof) s t . The intertemporal wedge at the optimal allocation is given
by r = 1 — exp(-cr2 ). The efficiency gains are given by A = 1 - jjprrr^ exP ( ^~6 C^^ •
The optimized allocation has a lower drift than the baseline allocation. Intuitively, our
perturbations based on parallel shifts in utility can be understood as allowing consumers
to borrow and save with an artificial idiosyncratic asset, the payoff of which is correlated
with their baseline idiosyncratic consumption process: they can increase their consump-
tion today by reducing their consumption tomorrow in such a way that they reduce their
consumption tomorrow more in states where consumption is high than in states where
consumption is low. The desirable insurance properties of these perturbation make them
attractive, leading to a front-loading of consumption. In other words, because our pertur-
bations allow for better insurance, they reduce the benefits of engaging in precautionary
savings by accumulating a buffer stock of risk free assets. As a result, it is optimal to
front-load consumption, by superimposing a downward drift exp(—of) on the baseline
allocation, where the variance in the growth rate of consumption of indexes the strength
of the precautionary savings motive at the baseline allocation.
In this example, the Inverse Euler equation provides a rationale for a constant and
positive wedge r = 1 — exp (—of) in the agent's Euler equation. This is in stark contrast
to the Chamley-Judd benchmark result, where no such distortion is optimal in the long
run, so that agents are allowed to save freely at the social rate of return.
The efficiency gains are increasing in of. Note that when of = 0, there are no efficiency
gains. For small values of of, the wedge is given by t ~ of. The formula for the efficiency
gains then takes the form of a simple Ramsey formula A ~ (/3/(l — /3) 2 ) t2 /2. At the
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other extreme, as of —> — log(/3) the efficiency gains asymptote 100%. The reason is that
then q —> 1, implying that the present value of the baseline consumption allocation goes
to infinity; in contrast, the cost of the optimal allocation remains finite.
General Equilibrium: Concave Technologies. In this section, we maintain the assump-
tion that utility is logarithmic. We also assume that the baseline allocation is a geometric
random walk representing a steady state with constant aggregates, Q = Css , K t — Kss
and Nf = Nss , that the shocks e are lognormally distributed and that the Euler equation
holds at the baseline allocation. We depart from the partial equilibrium assumption of
a linear technology, and consider instead the case of concave accumulation technologies.
We argue that the efficiency effects may be greatly reduced. This point is certainly not
surprising, nor is it specific to the model or forces emphasized here. Indeed, a similar
issue arises in the Ramsey literature, the quantitative effects of taxing capital greatly de-
pend on the underlying technology. 13 Unsurprising as it may, it is important to confront
this issue to reach meaningful quantitative conclusions. 16
The point that general equilibrium considerations are important can be made most
clearly from the following example. We consider the extreme case of a constant endow-
ment: the economy has no savings technology, so that Q < Nt for t = 0, 1, . . . [Huggert,
1993]. Then the baseline allocation is A-efficient. This follows since one finds a sequence
of intertemporal prices cjt such that the Inverse Euler equation (18) holds. Thus, in this
exchange economy there are no efficiency gains from changing the allocation. 17 Certainly
the fixed endowment case is an extreme example, but it serves to illustrate that general
equilibrium considerations are extremely important.
Consider now a neoclassical production function F(K, N). Applying the results in Sec-
tion 5.1, we can decompose the planning problem into a idiosyncratic planning problem
and an aggregate planning problem, with a corresponding decomposition for efficiency
gains. We have already argued that the corresponding efficiency gains are equal to zero
A ; = 0. Therefore, and just as in the partial equilibrium case, all the efficiency gains are
aggregate.
The aggregate planning problem is extremely simple. It seeks to determine the ag-
15 Indeed, Stokey and Rebelo [1995] discuss the effects of capital taxation in representative agent en-
dogenous growth models. They show that the effects on growth depend critically on a number of model
specifications. They then argue in favor of specifications with very small growth effects, suggesting that a
neoclassical growth model with exogenous growth may provide an accurate approximation.
16 A similar point is at the heart of Aiyagari's [1994] paper, which quantified the effects on aggregate
savings of uncertainty with incomplete markets. He showed that for given interest rates the effects could
be enormous, but that the effects were relatively moderate in the resulting equilibrium of the neoclassical
growth model.
17This point holds more generally in an endowment economy with CRRA utility when the baseline allo-
cation is a geometric random walk.
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gregate allocation {Q, Nt, K t , ACt} that maximizes the proportional amount of resources
saved in every period A, subject to the resource constraints
Kt+1 + Q + XCSS <(l-S)Kt + F(Kt , Nss ) t = 0, 1, . .
.
the restriction that the initial capital is equal the initial capital Kq — Kq of the baseline
allocation and the requirement that
£/5'U(C«) =^
ss)
t=0
This problem is a simple modification of the neoclassical growth model. The solution
involves a transition to a steady state with an interest rate equal to fss = 1//3 — 1. The
efficiency gains, which reflect the strength of the precautionary savings motive, depend
how much lower than fss is the interest rate rss = 1 / (/3 exp (of) ) at the baseline allocation.
This, in turn depends on the variance of consumption growth of.
Empirical Evidence. Suppose one wishes to accept the random walk specification of
consumption as a useful empirical approximation. What does the available empirical
evidence say about the crucial parameter of?
Unfortunately, the direct empirical evidence on the variance of consumption growth
is very scarce, due to the unavailability of good quality panel data for broad categories
of consumption. 18 Moreover, much of the variance of consumption growth in panel data
may be measurement error or attributable to transitory taste shocks unrelated to the per-
manent changes we are interested in here.
There are a few papers that, somewhat tangentially, provide some direct evidence on
the variance of consumption growth. We briefly review some of this recent work to pro-
vide a sense of what is currently available. Using PSID data, Storesletten, Telmer, and
Yaron [2004a] find that the variance in the growth rate of the permanent component of
food expenditure lies between l%-4%. Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston [2004] use PSID
data, but impute total consumption from food expenditure. Their estimates imply a vari-
ance of consumption growth of around 1%.20 Krueger and Perri [2004] use the panel
element in the Consumer Expenditure survey to estimate a statistical model of consump-
tion. At face value, their estimates imply enormous amounts of mobility and a very large
18 For the United States the PSID provides panel data on food expenditure, and is the most widely used
source in studies of consumption requiring panel data. However, recent work by Aguiar and Hurst [2005]
show that food expenditure is unlikely to be a good proxy for actual consumption.
19 See their Table 3, pg. 708.
See their footnote 19, pg 21, which refers to the estimated autocovariances from their Table VI.
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Figure 2: Efficiency gains in % when baseline consumption is a geometric random walk
for consumption and the Euler equation holds as function of of. The left panel shows the
gains in partial equilibrium and the right panel shows the gains in general equilibrium.
The bottom dotted line corresponds to /? = .96, the middle dashed line to /3 = .97 and top
plain line to j8 = .98.
variance of consumption growth—around 6%-7%—although most of this should be at-
tributed to a transitory, not permanent, component.21 In general, these studies reveal the
enormous empirical challenges faced in understanding the statistical properties of house-
hold consumption dynamics from available panel data.
An interesting indirect source of information is the cohort study by Deaton and Pax-
son [1994]. This paper finds that the cross-sectional inequality of consumption rises as
the cohort ages. The rate of increase then provides indirect evidence for of; their point
estimate implies a value of of — 0.0069. However, recent work using a similar method-
ology finds much lower estimates [Slesnick and Ulker, 2004, Heathcote, Storesletten, and
Violante, 2004].
Calibration. We now display the efficiency gains as a function of of. We choose three
21 They specify a Markov transition matrix with 9 bins (corresponding to 9 quantiles) for consumption.
We thank Fabrizio Perri for providing us with their estimated matrix. Using this matrix we computed that
the conditional variance of consumption growth had an average across bins of 0.0646 (this is for the year
2000, the last in their sample; but the results are similar for other years).
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possible discount factors /3 = 0.96, 0.97 and 0.98. For the linear technology model, this
imposes q = /Sexp(of). For the neoclassical growth model, we take F(K,N) = KaN l ~ a
with cc = 1/3. Figure 2 plots the efficiency gains as a function of exp(u^) for the linear
technology model and for the neoclassical growth model. The figure uses an empirically
relevant range for exp(crj).
Consider first the linear technology model. For the parameters under consideration,
the efficiency gains range from minuscule - less than 0.1% to very large - over 10%. The
effect of the discount factor f> is nearly equivalent to increasing the variance of shocks;
that is, moving from /3 = .96 to /3 = .98 has the same effect as doubling (i\. To understand
this, interpret the lower discounting not as a change in the actual subjective discount, but
as calibrating the model to a shorter period length. But then holding the variance of the
innovation between periods constant implies an increase in uncertainty over any fixed
length of time. Clearly, what matters is the amount of uncertainty per unit of discounted
time.
Consider now the neoclassical growth model. There again, there is considerable vari-
ation in the size of the efficiency gains, depending on the parameters. However, note that
the efficiency gains are much smaller than in the linear technology model. Large differ-
ences in interest rates fss — rss are necessary to generate substantial efficiency gains: it
takes a difference of around 2%, to get efficiency gains that are bigger than 1%.
Lessons. Three lessons emerge from our simple exercise. First, efficiency gains are po-
tentially far from trivial. Second, they are quite sensitive to two parameters available in
our exercise: the variance in the growth rate of consumption and the subjective discount
factor. Third, general equilibrium forces can greatly mitigate them.
We conclude that, in our view, the available empirical evidence does not provide re-
liable estimates for the variance of the permanent component of consumption growth.
Thus, for our purposes, attempts to specify the baseline consumption process directly are
impractical. That is, even if one were willing to assume the most stylized and parsimo-
nious statistical specifications for consumption, the problem is that the key parameter
remains largely unknown. This suggests that a preferable strategy is to use consumption
processes obtained from models that have been successful at matching the available data
on consumption and income. It also follows from this discussion that it is crucial to use
general equilibrium models is crucial to the quantitative assessment of the magnitude of
the efficiency gains.
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6 An Aiyagari Economy
We now we take the steady state equilibrium allocation of an incomplete market economy.
We adopt the calibrations from the seminal work of Aiyagari [1994].
The Aiyagari Economy. Aiyagari [1994] considered a Bewley economy, where a con-
tinuum of agents each solve an income fluctuations problem, saving in a risk free asset.
Efficiency labor is specified as a first-order autoregressive process in logarithms
logOt) = plog(nf-i) + (1 - p) log(n ss ) + £ f
where £f is an i.i.d. random variable assumed Normally distributed with mean zero and
standard deviation cr£ . With a continuum of mass one of agents the average efficiency
labor supply is Nss = nss . '
Labor income is given by the product wss n t where wss is the steady-state wage. Agents
face the following sequence of budget constraints
at+ i + c t < (1 + rss )a t + wss n t
for all t = 0, 1, In addition borrowing is not allowed: at > 0.
The equilibrium steady-state wage is given by the marginal product of labor wss =
Fn(KSS/ Nss ) and the interest rate is given by the net marginal product of capital, rss =
Fk(Kss,Nss ) — S. 22 For any interest rate rss < /3" 1 — 1, agent optimization leads to an
invariant cross-sectional distribution for St, which we denote by ip. A steady-state equi-
librium requires average assets, under ip, to equal the capital stock Kss .
Individual consumption is a function of the state variable St = (at, nt) which evolves
as a Markov process. We take this as our baseline allocation with agents distinguished by
their initial conditions i = so, distributed according to the invariant distribution ip.
Numerical Method. To solve the planning problem we use the result developed in Sec-
tion 4.2. To apply this result, we seek the appropriate sequence of discount factors {cjt}
as follows. For any given {qt} , we solve the non-stationary Bellman equation (23) using
a policy iteration method with Af_i as the endogenous state variable and St as the exoge-
nous state. Using the underlying policy function for consumption in equation (23), and
integrating in every period over ip, we compute an aggregate sequence of consumption
{Q}. Using the resource constraints, we can solve for A and a sequence for capital {Kt}
22 For simplicity this assumes no taxation. It is straightforward to introduce taxation. However, we
conjecture that since taxation of labor income acts as insurance, it effectively reduces the variance of shocks
to net income. Lower uncertainty will then only lower the efficiency gains we compute.
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that has Kq = Kss .
From Section 4.2, if the condition l/q t = 1 + FK(K t,Nss ) — 5 is met this constitutes
a solution. Otherwise, we take a new sequence of discount factors given by q'
t
= (1 +
Ffc(Xf,
N
ss )
— S)' 1 and iterate until convergence to a fixed point.
Calibration. We simulate the economy for all the parameter values considered in Aiya-
gari [1994]. The discount factor is set to /3 = .96, the production function is Cobb-Douglas
with a share of capital of 0.36, capital depreciation is 0.08. The utility function is assumed
CRRA so that U(c) = c1-D7(l — cr) with a G {1,3,5}. Aiyagari argues, based on var-
ious sources of empirical evidence, for a baseline parametrization with a coefficient of
autocorrelation of p = 0.6 and a standard deviation of labor income of 20%. Following
Aiyagari, we also consider different values for the coefficient of relative risk aversion , the
autocorrelation coefficient p G {0,0.3,0.6,0.9} and the standard deviation of log income,
Std(log(n f )) =cr£ G {0.2,0.4}.
These values are based on the following studies. Kydland [1984] finds that the stan-
dard deviation cr£ of annual hours worked from PSID data is around 15%. Using data
from the PSID and the NLS, Abowd and Card [1987] and Abowd and Card [1989] find
that the standard deviation of percentage changes in real earnings and annual hours are
about 40% and 35% respectively. They report a first order serial correlation coefficient p of
about 0.3, resulting in a estimate of cr£ of 34%. Using PSID data, Heaton and Lucas [1996]
estimate a range of 0.23 to 0.53 for p and a range of 27% to 40% for aE .
Some recent studies, within a life cycle context, consider an alternative approach and
estimate a process for log earnings indirectly, by using the increase in the observed cross-
sectional inequality of earnings over time within a cohort. Two views have been articu-
lated. The first view, dating back to Deaton and Paxson [1994] and developed most re-
cently by Storesletten et al. [2004a] and Storesletten et al. [2004b], posits that the increase
in earning inequality over time within a cohort is due to large and persistent income
shocks. This leads to estimates of p around or above 0.9 and a range of estimates for <j£
between 0.3 and 0.6, on the high end of the range of parameter values explored by Aiya-
gari [1994]. The second view, dating back to Lillard and Weiss [1979] and Hause [1980],
and developed Guvenen [2007] and Guvenen [2009], argues that the increase in cross sec-
tional earnings inequality over time within a cohort is better explained by an alternative
model where agents face individual-specific income profiles. This view leads to lower
values for p and cr£ , around 0.8 and 25% respectively. Since both approaches are based
on a life-cycle framework, the estimates are not directly relevant for our infinite horizon
setup. Indeed, as we have shown, a key object for our analysis is the conditional variance
of consumption growth which depends on the conditional variance of permanent income
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Figure 3: Path of aggregate consumption for the baseline and the optimized allocations
for cr = 1, Std(lqg(ttf) - log(n t _i)) = .4 and p = 0.9.
growth. Life-cycle models incorporate a retirement period, generating a longer horizon
for consumption than for labor income. This reduces the impact of permanent income
shocks on consumption. Taking this into account, estimates for the persistence p and the
standard deviation of labor income uz derived in the context of a life-cycle model would
therefore have to be adjusted downwards in order to be used in our numerical exercises.
Results. We find that the optimized allocation always features aggregates converging to
new steady state values: Q —» Css , Kt —> Kss , q t —> cjss as t —> cop Figure 3 plots the path
of aggregate consumption for one particular parameter case. Since the baseline allocation
represents a steady state, its aggregate consumption is constant. Aggregate consumption
for the optimized allocation is initially above this level, but declines monotonically, even-
tually reaching a new, lower, steady state. For the same parameter values, Figure 4 shows
a typical sample path for individual income, cash in hand, consumption and utility. Op-
timized consumption appears more persistent and displays a downwards trend in the
initial periods.
Tables 1, 2 and 3 collect the results of our simulations. All tables report our measure
of efficiency gains, A. In the logarithmic utility case (a = 1), Table 1 includes the idiosyn-
cratic and aggregate components X 1 and XA . For references, the tables show the baseline
and optimized steady state interest rates rss and rss . The second column, showing rss ,
replicates Aiyagari's Table II (pg. 678).
23 In the case of logarithmic utility functions, we provided a formal proof of this result in Section 5.1. In
the more general CRRA utility function case, we rely solely on our numerical results.
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Figure 4: Simulation of a typical individual sample path for a = 1, Std(log(ftf) —
log(«f_i)) = .4andj0 = 0.9.
The baseline's interest rate rss is decreasing in the size and persistence of the shocks,
as well as in the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Precautionary saving motives are
stronger and depress the equilibrium interest rate. The interest rates at the optimized
allocation are consistent with the conclusions from Proposition 2. In particular, fss =
1/ ft — 1 when utility is logarithmic, and fss > 1//S — 1 when a > 1. Moreover, we find
that fss increases with <j and the size and the persistence of the labor income shocks.
These comparative statics for rss are precisely the reverse of those for rss . This is perhaps
not surprising, given the reversal in the sign of the power coefficients in the Inverse Euler
and Euler equations, cr and —a, respectively.
Efficiency gains are increasing with the variance of the shocks and with their persis-
tence. They also increase with the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Aiyagari argues,
based on various sources of empirical evidence, for a parameterization with a coefficient
of autocorrelation of p = 0.6 and a standard deviation of labor income of 20%. For this
preferred specification,, we find that efficiency gains are small - below 0.2% for all three
values for the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
In the logarithmic case, efficiency gains are moderate - always less than 1.3%. Our
decomposition along the lines of Section 5.1 shows that idiosyncratic efficiency gains A'
completely dwarf aggregate efficiency gains XA . Our finding that idiosyncratic gains are
modest could have perhaps been anticipated by our illustrative geometric random-walk
example, where idiosyncratic gains are zero. Intuitively, efficiency gains from the idiosyn-
cratic component require differences in the expected consumption growth rate across in-
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o- = 1 and Std(logQf) - log(n f _!)) = .2
Efficiency Gains
p ?ss ''ss Idiosyncratic Aggregate Total Borrowing
4.14% 4.17% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
0.3 4.13% 4.17% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
0.6 4.09% 4.17% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
0.9 3.95% 4.17% 0.2% 0.0% 0.2% 0.1%
a = 1 and Std(log(n f ) - log(n t -i)) - -4
Efficiency Gains
p 1'ss 1'ss Idiosyncratic Aggregate Total Borrowing
4.06% 4.17% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1%
0.3 3.97% 4.17% 0.2% 0.0% 0.2% 0.2%
0.6 3.79% 4.17% . ' 0.4% 0.0% 0.4% 0.3%
0.9 3.38% 4.17% 1.2% 0.1% 1.3% 1.1%
Table 1: Efficiency Gains for replication of Aiyagari [1994]when a = 1.
dividuals. When individuals smooth their consumption over time effectively the remain-
ing differences are small—as a result, so are the efficiency gains. Efficiency gains from the
aggregate component are directly related to the difference between the equilibrium and
optimal stead-state capital. With logarithmic utility this is equivalent, to the difference be-
tween the equilibrium steady-state interest rate and ft~
l
— 1, the interest rate that obtains
with complete markets. Hence, our finding of low aggregate efficiency gains is directly
related to Aiyagari's [1994] main conclusion: for shocks that are not implausibly large
or for moderate risk aversion, precautionary savings are small in the aggregate, in that
steady-state capital and interest rate are close their complete-markets levels, as shown in
our Table 1.
For the range of parameters that we consider, the efficiency gains range from minus-
cule - less than 0.1%- to very large - more than 8.4%. However, efficiency gains larger
than 1.3% are only reached for combinations of high values of relative risk aversion -
(J greater than 3- and both large and highly persistent shocks - a standard deviation of
labor income of 40%, and a mean-reversion coefficient p greater than 0.6.
The Role of Borrowing Constraints. The market arrangement in Aiyagari's economy
imposes borrowing constraints that limit the ability to trade consumption intertempo-
rally. At the baseline allocation, the Euler equation holds with equality U'(c(u\)) =
/3(1 + rss )Ej. [L7
/ (c(u[
+1 ))] holds when assets and current income are high enough. How-
ever, for low levels of assets and income, the agent may be borrowing constrained so that
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<7 = 3 and Std(log(n f ) — log(n t _i)) = .2
Efficiency Gains
SS I ss Total Borrowing
4.09% 4.21% 0.0%
0.3 4.02% 4.37% 0.0%
0.6 3.88% 4.45% 0.2%
0.9 3.36% 4.75% 0.7%
0.0%
0.0%
0.2%
0.7%
a -= 3 and Std(log(n f ) --log(n f_i)) = .4
I'ss 1~ss
Efficiency Gains
p Total Borrowing
3.77% 4.62% 0.2%
0.3 3.47% 4.77% 0.5%
0.6 2.89% 5.03% 1.2%
0.9 1.47% 5.56% 4.2%
0.2%
0.5%
1.2%
3.3%
Table 2: Efficiency Gains for replication of Aiyagari [1994]when u = 3.
the Euler conditions holds with strict inequality U'(c(u\)) > B(l + rss )Ef [U'(c(u lt+1 ))]
.
In contrast, since our planning problem does not impose arbitrary restrictions on
the perturbations, it places no such limits on intertemporal reallocation of consumption.
Thus, the perturbations can effectively undo limits to borrowing. As a result, part of the
efficiency gains we compute can be attributed to the relaxation of borrowing constraints,
not to the introduction of savings distortions.
To get an idea of the efficiency gains that are obtained from the relaxation of borrowing
constraints, we performed the following exercise. The basic idea is to use the perturba-
tions to construct a new allocation where the Euler equation always holds with equality.
That is, the new allocation stops short of satisfying the Inverse Euler equation, so it does
not introduce positive intertemporal wedges. Instead, it removes the negative intertem-
poral wedges that were present due to borrowing constraints. We compute the resource
savings from this perturbations as a simple measure of the efficiency gains due to the
relaxation of borrowing constraints.24
More precisely, we seek to determine the unique allocation {u\' , n\, Kf, ABCSS }, where
B stands for borrowing, that satisfies the following constraints. First, we impose that
the allocation be achievable through parallel perturbations of the baseline allocation, and
deliver the same utility
K B }eY(K},0).
24Theoretically, it isn't evident that these perturbations actually produce positive efficiency gains, as op-
posed to negative ones. In our cases, the measure always came out to be positive.
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a = 5 and Std(log(n f ) - log(n f _i)) = .2
Efficiency Gains
ss ' ss Total Borrowing
4.01% 5.34% 0.0%
0.3 3.89% 5.39% 0.0%
0.6 3.61% 5.48% 0.2%
0.9 2.66% 5.72% 1.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.2%
1.0%
a = 5 and Std(log(n f ) — log(n f_i)) = .4
Efficiency Gains
p rss r$s Total Borrowing
3.43% 5.54% 0.2% 0.2%
0.3 2.90% 5.55% 0.7% 0.7%
0.6 1.95% 5.58% 2.1% 2.0%
0.9 -0.16% 5.52% 8.4% 6.3%
Table 3: Efficiency Gains for replication of Aiyagari [1994]when (7 = 5.
Second, we impose that the resource constraints hold
K?+l + J
E
l [c(wj' B ) Pr(^ f )] dip + X
BCSS < (1 - S)Kf + F{K?,
N
ss ) t = 0, 1, • •
and require that the initial capital be equal the initial capital KB = Ko of the baseline
allocation. Finally, we impose that the Euler equation hold for every agent in every period
W{c(u) B )) = fS[l-6 + FK (K?+1 , Nss )]E\[U
f (c(u l
t
'
B
+1 ))}.
The allocation {u l( , n\, KB , ABQ} can improve on the baseline allocation by insuring that
the Euler equation holds for every agent in every period. Note that this allocation does
not satisfy the Inverse Euler equation and is therefore not A-efficient. We adopt XB as our
measure of the efficiency gains deriving from the relaxation of borrowing constraints.
The rightmost column in each of table reports the efficiency gains XB that can be at-
tributed to the relaxation of borrowing constraints. Perhaps the most important conclu-
sion of our numerical exercise can be drawn by comparing the efficiency gains A with the
efficiency gains A B deriving from the relaxation of borrowing constraints. We find that
for all size and persistence of shocks, and all utility specifications, most of the efficiency
gains come from the relaxation of borrowing constraints. Indeed, the difference between
A and AB is less than 0.1% except for the largest and most persistent shocks - a standard
deviation of labor income growth of 40%, and a mean-reversion coefficient p greater than
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0.9. In other words, most of the efficiency come from allowing agents to better smooth
their consumption over time by alleviating borrowing constraints, rather than by opti-
mally distorting savings as prescribed by the substitution the Inverse Euler equation to
the Euler equation.
7 Conclusions
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a method for evaluating the auxiliary
role that savings distortions may play in social insurance arrangements. We put it to use
to evaluate the welfare importance of recent arguments for distorting savings and capital
accumulation based on the Inverse Euler equation.
We believe that the methodological contribution of this paper transcends our own
quantitative explorations of it. The method developed here is flexible enough to accom-
modate several extensions and it may be of interest to investigate how these may affect
the quantitative conclusions found here for the benchmark Aiyagari economy. In a sep-
arate paper [Farhi and Werning, 2008] we pursued such an extension using Epstein-Zin
preferences that separate risk aversion from the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. In
ongoing work, we study an environment with overlapping-generations instead of the in-
finite horizon dynastic setup used here. This introduces intergenerational considerations
that are absent in our setting. In particular, with an infinitely-lived agent we have shown
that the planner chooses a declining sequence for capital. In an overlapping-generations
model this feature, in and of itself, affects future generations negatively. This points to-
wards finding lower potential efficiency gains. However, new opportunities for intertem-
poral reallocations do arise since consumption can be shifted across generations, for any
given aggregate sequence of consumption. Finally, as discussed in Section 6, an overlap-
ping generation requires a different calibration of the income process. Despite these new
considerations, the basic methodology and decompositions introduced here are useful for
such extensions.
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Appendix
A Proofs for Section 3.2
To simplify the arguments, we first assume that the horizon is finite with terminal period
T > 0. We also assume that V (n; 0) is continuously differentiable with respect to n and 0.
We also assume throughout that shocks are continuous.
Consider an assignment for utility and labor {u\,n\}. We define the continuation
value U (0 !,t ) conditional on history Q l,t as follows
u l ( e ut ) = E LP
s=0
Kt+*l0y+')-V>i+B f 'f+s );0JM-s »,t
Fix a history z,f and consider a report 0J G 0. Define the strategy cr|.' as follows:
tr|'' (e 1 '3 ) = e
{
'
s except if 6 { 's >z
f
'
f
, in which case
This strategy coincides with truth-telling except in period t after history 9 l,t where the
report 6\ can be different from the true shock 0\.
For clarity and brevity we use the notation ,s for crJ (0 !,s ). We denote the continua-
t
tion utility after history BhS >z O
1
'* under the strategy op, by IP (op (0 f 's ) J or IP (0''
s
;
&'*)
for short. Similarly we denote by E [IP (§ i 's;6 i' t )] or E [IP (&'*) 10*'*] the expectation of
this continuation utility conditional on the realized history 6 l,t at date t.
We say that the assignment for utility and labor [u l
t
, n\ } is regular if for all f > and
Qht-l
^ ©^^ continuation utility IP (0 Z/f ; 0,-^) is absolutely continuous in the true shock
Q\, differentiable with respect to the true shock 9\, and the derivative, which we denote by
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rVtnie1'*)-^ 1 ^-E
del
ip §i,t+A \Qi,t
is bounded by a function b(9\; !,t ~ 1 ) which is integrable with respect to Q\.
Consider two regular, incentive compatible, assignments for utility and labor {u\,n\}
and { u\, n\ } , that share the same assignment for labor [n\ }. Denote by { IP } and { U 1 }
the corresponding continuation utilities. We now show that there exists A_j G 1R such
that {u}} eYKnj}^).
Note we can restate the result as follows: for all t with < t < T — 1 and for all
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Qi,t-i
e
Qt
f there exists A {d ht
~ l
) G R such that
u 1 (&'*) = u l (<9
;
'
f
) + a (e^-
1
(27)
Fix a history 9 l,t and consider the strategies trJ . Using Theorem 4 in Milgrom and Segal
[2002], Incentive compatibility and regularity implies the following Envelope condition
LT'fV''-
1
,^) =ui (e i't-\ety
+
-4 |wv (B (fiW) ;«)+^iwE L7 Z 6>« /5;,f+l 1(^-1^1) ^1 (28)
where 9 { 't+s = (fl 1'-'- 1 , 0J; 0J+1 , ..., 6
l
t+s ) for all s > and ^'
t
"
s
= 0''
f - s for all s > 0.
The same expression holds for [u\, n\). Using the fact that shocks are continuous and
that {u\,n\} and {w*
f
,
n[} share the same labor assignment, this implies that there exists
A (e 1 ' 1
' 1
) G R such that
it ei fpi,t\ _ 7Ti (pi,tu x e 1A + A [6ii.t-1
n r
e
'< 5
„ { )ey«t=e i
E i,t+AQi(0i,t+i\ _ Ui(Qut+i\ \{e\_ lt e del
For t = T, the last term on the right hand side vanishes and we have that for all
qi,t
e
©r+i^ there exists A (0 Z 'T
~ 1
) G R such that (27) holds. We proceed by induction on
t. Suppose that t > and that for all 6 ht G t+1 , there exists A (6^) G R such that (27)
holds. Then applying (28) and using the fact that
a
gji0M E a 0" He
1''-. 1
.,?'*)i,t-\ 5i> o,
we immediately find that for all 6 ht 1 G & there exists A (9 l,t 1 ) G R such that
Q*'(V) =LT(0i'f)+A(0 ,';'- 1
The proof follows by induction.
When the horizon is infinite, the regularity conditions must be complemented with a
limit condition. For example, expanding our Envelope condition over two periods, we
find
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EU l (V- f ) = IF (V'
f
) + A (f^ 1 ) +jS2 /'
if) (T ! 'f+2 ) |(T ! ' f>f+1 ) iTiK^'*- 1,^)
/fi ae~r!=(?l
't+i
det+i
?}+!= ^ !f+ i
E if dm
Consider the sequence which is constructed by iterating our Envelope condition for the
utility and labor assignment {u\, n\}. The first element of the sequence is
i,t+A \(5i,t-l Sifru 1
^
!
'
t+1
J
k^- 1,^)
Similarly, the second element of the sequence is
del.
n
% d
de\ e\=e\
E Ui f^i,t+i\ kV^^^+1)] dVjK^- 1,^) „ej
Our proof then carries over if the condition that the limit of these terms when the number
of iterations goes to infinity is equal to zero is added to the requirements for regularity.
B Proof of Proposition 3
With logarithmic utility the Bellman equation is
K(s,A_) =min[sexp(A_ - jSA) + qE[K{s',A) \ s]]
= min[sexp((l-
i
6)A_+£(A_ - A)) + qE[K(s',A) \ s}}
A
Substituting that K(A_ ,s) = fc(s)exp((l — j6)A_) gives
k{s) exp((l - /3)A_) = min[s exp((l - /3)A_ + /S(A_ - A)) + qE[k(s') exp((l - /3)A) | s]],
and cancelling terms:
fc(s) = min[sexp(/S(A_ - A)) +.flE[fc(s')exp((l - «)(A - A_))
|
si]
A
= min[sexp(-/3<i)+<7E[/c(s / )exp((l - fi)d) \ s]}
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= min[sexp(-Bd) + qE[k(s') \ s] exp((l - B)d)]
d
where d = A — A_. We can simplify this one dimensional Bellman equation further.
Define q(s) = qH[k(s f ) | s]/s and
M{q) = min[exp(-jSd) + #exp((l - j8)d)].
The first-order conditions gives
Bexp(-^d)=q(l-B)exp({l-B)d) = *=log
_f (29)
Substituting back into the objective we find that
Mtf) = i^'expt-M = T^exp (-/Jlog-L)
= 1 ^ = B^,(l-B)i-
where B is a constant defined in the obvious way in terms of B.
The operator associated with the Bellman equation is then
T[k)(s) = sM (q*M£Ll£\ = As 1-? (E[fc(s') | s]) p ,
where A = Bq? = {q/Bf/{\ - B) 1 "^.
Combining the Bellman k(s)/s = M(q) = AqP with equation (29) yields the policy
function as a function of K(s). This completes the proof.
C Proof of Proposition 4
Consider the aggregate allocation {Ct,Nt,Kt,XCt} that solves the Aggregate planning
problem and the utility assignment {u\} 6 Y({u\},0) that solve the Idiosyncratic plan-
ning problem as well as the corresponding idiosyncratic efficiency gains X 1 .
Since the resource constraints hold with equality in the Idiosyncratic planning prob-
lem, we know from Lemma 1 that there exists a sequence of prices {Qt}, such that
c
!
(u\) = qJE)[c'(u\+l )} £ = 0,1,.-. (30)
46
where q t = Qt+i/Qt- Moreover, the sequence {q t } is given by q t = PQ/Ct+i.
The aggregate allocation {Q, Nf/ Kj, AQ} satisfies the necessary and sufficient first-
order conditions
U'(Ct)=p(l-6 + FK(Kt+1,Nt+1))U, (Ct+1 ) t = 0,l,:.. (31)
Define the following sequence {St}
5t = -U({l-X 1 )C t ) + U(C t ) t = 0,l,...
We have Y^L ^S t = 0. With this choice of {St}, we then define a utility assignment
{u\} £ Y({Wf},0) as follows u\ = u\ + St. The allocation {u\,n l
t
,Kt,XCt} then satisfies all
the constraints of the original planning problem. Moreover using c'(u\) = c'{5t)c'{u\),
equation (30) and equation (31), we find that
c'(u\) = ^E\[c'(u't+1 )] f = 0,l,...
where
1 = q t {FK(Kt+1 ,
N
t+1 ) + l-S) 1 = 0,1,...
Hence the allocation {u l
t
,n\,Kt/ XCt} satisfies the sufficient first order conditions in the
planning problem. It therefore represents the optimum.
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